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Abstract. The article is dedicated to the revelation of heuristic potential of hermeneutic image conception 
within discussions on contemporary visual culture. H. G. Gadamer has analysed the image as the visual, 
spatial and social phenomenon expanding and thereby transforming the accustomed notion of iconic 
experience. The image is not primarily an object of research for aesthetics and art criticism, but a social 
phenomenon which has to be considered in its real and imagined character as well as in its interrelations 
with the lived world structures. By blurring boundaries between art and life in his image theory Gadamer 
opens up an array of opportunities for the analysis of iconic practices in all their variety: from science to 
theater.
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Introduction: retrieving the  
hermeneutic conception of image
No doubt, the problematics of the image and 
art experience has played a very important 
role in the phenomenological hermeneutics, 
especially since it has been widely recog-
nized as one of the most influential trends in 
the 20th century philosophy. In Heidegger’s 
later philosophy, experience of art is one 
of the key regions where the event of his-
torical truth that surpasses every subject’s 
cognitive activities can take place. Gadamer 
considers the art and image experience as 
a general model for the hermeneutical phe-
nomena and hermeneutical understanding 
* this article is based on the results of the research 
project supported by academic Foundation of Natio-
nal research university Higher School of economics 
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that, on their part, were expected to offer 
a new paradigm of the researcher’s self-
consciousness in the humanities. 
On the other hand, despite the high sig-
nificance which the image problematics had 
for the founding fathers and protagonists 
of the phenomenological hermeneutics, it 
was embedded in the specific contexts of 
their philosophical positions. as a result, 
the hermeneutical theory of the image 
per se remained undeveloped and hence 
underestimated. 
But what makes the review of the current 
state of affairs in hermeneutical reflexions 
on the nature of image necessary? What are 
the reasons for the elaboration of more or 
less autonomous and coherent hermeneuti-
cal image conception? 
the answer is relatively simple and 
obvious: changes occurred in the contem-
porary culture in the latter two decades that 
can be summarized by such emblematic 
expressions as “visual turn”, “iconic turn” 
or “pictorial turn”. All these “turns” point 
out, in the first instance, the increasing 
proliferation of various forms of visual 
and iconic experiences in all dimensions 
of contemporary social life: from domi-
nance of visual tools and forms in shaping 
our self-identities to inevitability of visual 
models in scientific research. Moreover, 
these formulas imply that the contempo-
rary visual culture is an integrative factor 
of contemporary culture in general affect-
ing all existing, even non-visual, media 
and kinds of experience. and last but not 
least, they mean the acknowledgment of 
the historical and anthropological roots 
of contemporary rise of visuality, which 
continue to have an influence upon recent 
cultural dispositions.
thus, nowadays, in the age of so-called 
“visual culture”, the hermeneutical theory 
of image gains new urgency. It should be 
released from the “confessional” restric-
tions imposed upon it by its philosophical 
roots. It has to be put in a broader context 
of contemporary discussions about the so-
cial and cognitive nature of visual images 
and visuality at all. In these contexts, many 
important traits of hermeneutical image 
conception, hovering for a long time in the 
background of researchers’ attention, would 
come to the foreground. In the first instance, 
it is the idea of structural interconnections 
between visual characteristics, spatial con-
ditions, and communicative effects that 
make the hermeneutical image theory a 
strong partner in recent social-theoretical 
and philosophical debates about the con-
temporary (visual) culture. 
In what follows we begin with brief 
reconstruction of transformative logic of 
phenomenology that led it from the “strong 
science” project to the broadly understood 
hermeneutical philosophy, or phenomeno-
logical hermeneutics (in the second sec-
tion). then we will examine the status and 
function of the question about the nature 
of the artistic image in phenomenological 
hermeneutics (third section), and finally – in 
the fourth section  – proceed to clarification 
of the basic structures of image percep-
tion from hermeneutical viewpoint: the 
structural interrelation between perception, 
meaning, and spatiality in the visual image 
experience. In the concluding part we will 
outline the perspectives of application of 
hermeneutical image conception in the 
recent discussions about social functions 
of visual images. 
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Structure and event, being  
and image: phenomenological  
hermeneutics on the way  
from ontology to cultural theory
as is known, in the history of the phenom-
enological movement there was a sequence 
of substantial turning points, each of which 
made its own contribution to the modifica-
tion of original profile of phenomenological 
project. the turn to the life world prob-
lematic that occurred in the late 1910s in 
the university courses of both Husserl and 
Heidegger was probably the most important 
among them. The very term “life world” 
suggests surpassing the initial theoretical 
self-understanding of Husserl’s phenom-
enology which from the very beginning 
took the idea of a singular act of conscious-
ness directed toward a particular object as 
its starting point and at the same time as a 
basic concept of phenomenon. Since then 
neither an act of intentional consciousness, 
nor a particular object given to it, i.e., a 
phenomenon, serves as a starting point 
and the main subject of phenomenologi-
cal analysis. Our perceptual and cognitive 
activities prove to be already embedded in 
the manifold horizons and potentialities that 
support and restrict them at the same time. 
But, according to Husserl, these horizons 
and contexts are invariably of perceptual 
and cognitive nature, leaving historical and 
social-communicative presuppositions out 
of consideration. It is quite symptomatic 
that Husserl preferred to speak about natu-
ral attitude rather than everyday experience. 
“Natural”, in the given context, connotes 
both “naïve” and “non-historical”, while 
“attitude” means a feature of a subject. On 
the contrary, the very notion of everyday 
experience foregrounds historicity as well 
as priority of communicative relations over 
perceptual ones.
young Heidegger makes a decisive step 
toward unrestricted recognition of the phe-
nomenological relevance of the life world 
without reducing it, like Husserl, to the mere 
guiding function (Leitfaden-Funktion) in 
the context of explication of more deeply 
rooted structures of transcendental subjec-
tivity. 
For young Heidegger the life world 
is not something situated in front of the 
analyzing consciousness. On the contrary, 
we are “always already” entangled in a 
ceaseless process of the world articulation 
which takes place beyond any theoreti-
cal statement and attitude. Moreover, our 
subjectivity, our ability to maintain identity 
through many experiences springs from 
these articulation processes, and preserves 
in it their vestiges. 
In other words, our ability to see things 
around us follows “our” pre-theoretical ar-
ticulation of the world and self, not the other 
way around. the disclosure of the primary 
world structures is, according to Heidegger, 
an effect of some everyday experiences, and 
it takes place in and as these experiences 
themselves. 
In his first course of lectures (1919) 
Heidegger offers an example of convincing 
phenomenological, and at the same time 
pre-theoretical, description of an everyday 
perceptual experience, an experience of see-
ing the lectern. according to Heidegger‘s 
interpretive description, what we see in 
this case is not a set of the isolated material 
objects arranged in the given physical space. 
As Heidegger puts it: “I see the lectern in 
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one fell swoop, so to speak, and not in isola-
tion, but as adjusted a bit too high for me. 
I see – and immediately so – a book lying 
upon it as annoying to me (a book, not a col-
lection of layered pages with black marks 
strewn upon them), I see the lectern in an 
orientation, an illumination, a background” 
(Heidegger 2000: 60). 
thus, it is important to mention that, 
on the one hand, in his lecture Heidegger 
follows Husserl’s favorite mode and object 
of phenomenological description (seeing a 
material object), but on the other hand, as 
opposed to Husserl, he underscores prin-
cipally holistic, pragmatically motivated, 
performative and interpretive character of 
everyday visual perceptions. In the contexts 
of everyday experiences the visual percep-
tions are principally environmental and im-
mediately meaningful. “This environmental 
milieu – Heidegger writes – (lectern, book, 
blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, care-
taker, student fraternity, tram-car, motor-car, 
etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, 
which are then conceived as meaning this 
and this; rather, the meaningful is primary 
and immediately given to me without any 
mental detours across thing-oriented ap-
prehension. living in an environment, it 
signifies to me everywhere and always, 
everything has the character of world (ital-
ics supplied)” (Ibid.: 61).
In our everyday perceptual experiences, 
what we usually see in the first instance and 
immediately is not an arbitrary array of the 
particular material objects but the meaning-
ful whole, i.e., the world. Materiality within 
our everyday visual experiences is not sepa-
rately perceptible but always embedded in 
the meaningful whole that we find ourselves 
permanently in. What Heidegger calls “the 
meaningful” is, in turn, something visually 
palpable, manifesting itself only within the 
practically motivated and oriented seeing, 
which thus cannot be reduced to the bare 
visual perception. the meaning here is not 
something that lies beyond the factual envi-
ronmental experience itself. In this regard it 
seems quite appropriate to call the dynamic 
and factual intercoupling of the experience 
and the experienced a performative medium 
that is an indissoluble complex of at least 
three aspects: meaning, space, and action. 
Performativity manifests itself also in the 
character of an event indispensable to the 
environmental experiences in Heidegger’s 
sense. The event means here in the first 
instance the radical enhancement of the 
experiencing subject’s facticity. the more 
deeply we immerse in the factual, i.e., his-
torically and socially determined exercise of 
environmental perception, the more origi-
nally the world, that is, “the meaningful” 
discloses itself. Increasingly performative 
and factual perception of the meaningful 
should be understood as a kind of move-
ment toward the primary. It is remarkable 
that Husserl has always moved in the op-
posite direction: from the given (factual) to 
the universal (structural). there is a strong 
correlation between intensity and event-
character of environmental live experience 
and primordiality of world-disclosure. So, 
environmental experience occures not so 
much in the world but as the world itself. 
Hence, the environmental experience as a 
basic mode of the everyday pre-theoretical 
perception has no periphery. It is factual 
but not regional. It means that this kind of 
experience is the source of each regional 
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differentiation as well as of all possible 
distinctions between the singular and uni-
versal. Both differentiation and distinction 
become possible only as a consequence of 
the objectification process building a con-
stituent part of our everyday experiences. 
Further, an isolated perception is both an 
essential part and ontological ground of 
so-called theoretical attitude, resulting 
from the thematic and modal switching 
within the everyday perception experi-
ences themselves (from a diffuse dwelling 
in emotionally tinged environment to the 
focused perception of a singular object). 
essential to those experiences is not the 
distance-keeping toward an object but a 
radical entanglement in familiar, sensual 
and, at the same time, meaningful environ-
ment (world).
Gadamer goes several steps further in 
the same direction, that is to say, toward the 
radical review of the idea of autonomous 
thinking. at the same time, these steps prove 
to be the steps on the way from phenome-
nological-hermeneutical ontology to a kind 
of hermeneutical theory of culture.
as is known, Gadamer has taken up 
and developed Heidegger’s early notion of 
irreversible facticity of human existence. 
But unlike Heidegger, Gadamer considers 
facticity in the first place not as an object of 
theoretical analysis but rather as a practical 
task, as a primary environment that a human 
being should make him or herself practi-
cally familiar with. Moreover, he places 
it in – and even identifies with – a wide 
range of everyday practices. In this regard 
philosophical hermeneutics grants more 
autonomy to everyday experience, more 
independence from analyzing conscious-
ness. In ontological sense, this autonomy 
means that the irreversibly opaque everyday 
life remains inescapable and permanent 
“source of the self” including both scientific 
and philosophical one. In epistemological 
sense, it means inadequacy of any reflexive 
approach to the events of world disclosing 
that, despite their transcending pragmatic 
connections with everyday life, remain its 
integral part. 
among many examples of such events 
we should mention in the first instance, fol-
lowing Gadamer, experience of art, which 
he thinks of as a kind of meaningful spatial 
experience occurring amidst everyday life. 
In the next section we will discuss the gene-
sis of Gadamer’s notion of the spatial nature 
of art, or artistic image in the context of his 
hermeneutical project as well as its relation 
to the non-artistic space experience. 
Play, structure, image:  
performativity and mediality  
as key features of the hermeneutic 
image conception
as is known, Gadamer begins his path-
breaking reflexions on the nature of un-
derstanding of cultural meanings with 
ontological analysis of the experience of 
art, mainly exemplified by its visual forms. 
This analysis fulfills an expository and, first 
of all, methodological function in Gad-
amer’s hermeneutical project. In Truth and 
Method, where it embraces nearly whole 
first part of the book, it serves the purpose 
of introducing an idea of specifically cogni-
tive potential of some cultural experiences 
beyond methodological strategies of the 
Humanities. But what kind of truth and 
epistemological experiences does Gadamer 
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have in mind, speaking of а knowledge 
beyond method? How are truth and event 
in Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory inter-
connected? 
to answer these questions, we will 
undertake a brief critical reconstruction of 
Gadamer’s argument regarding the episte-
mological implications of art experience. 
In our reconstruction, we will go through 
three stages marked by respective key 
concepts: play, structure (Gebilde), and 
image (Bild).
Play
Gadamer chose the “concept of play” as 
his “starting point”, because of the role 
that this concept played both in modern 
aesthetics and anthropology. We would add 
that another reason for this choice was an 
intermediate and transitive character of the 
phenomenon of play. In a sense, it belongs 
to two worlds simultaneously: being one 
of our social everyday experiences, it, at 
the same time, transcends them, forming a 
kind of quasi-autonomous sphere. Michael 
Foucault called such practices heterotopy: 
the performative places that being parts 
of the given physical and social places 
are, nevertheless, able to transform them. 
We will call this feature of play mediality, 
thereby expanding respective motives of 
Gadamer’s thought. this term matches 
well with what Gadamer aimed to do in the 
first place, namely to “free this concept of 
the subjective meaning” (Gadamer 2004: 
102).
Gadamer achieves a desired effect in 
two ways. One of them is phenomenologi-
cal description of the play process, which 
is considered to be a genuine “subject” of 
playing. the play is substantially performa-
tive. It is a process, which, once launched, 
immediately follows its own logic and 
purpose. the player is not a “leader” of the 
whole process, but only one of its structural 
components. thus, performativity proves 
to be one of the key features of the process 
of play. the second way to overcome the 
subjectivist meaning of the concept of play 
is its “trans-regional” interpretation. This 
means that Gadamer insists on non-human, 
or universal, character of the play phenom-
enon. Moreover, from this notion he draws 
methodological consequences that consist 
first of all in necessitating an overturn of 
traditional perspective on the phenomenon 
of play and game. the human play is to be 
considered an integral part of the wide range 
of the play phenomena, including the play 
of animals and even inanimate objects in 
natural environments (Ibid.: 105). 
to support his thesis, Gadamer refers to 
biology that acknowledged the insufficiency 
of the notion of a biological purpose for 
“understanding the form of living things” 
(Gadamer 2004: 108). Thus, according to 
Gadamer, the “self-presentation is a uni-
versal ontological characteristic of nature”, 
including human beings both as social 
and natural entities (Ibid.: 108). Actually, 
Gadamer’s notion of play is aimed at blur-
ring ontological boundaries between the 
natural and social, the animal and human, 
at least as to phenomenological conditions 
of their primary appearing in the horizon of 
our experiences. this thesis could be sup-
ported by such a characteristic of play as a 
having of “its own proper spirit” (Gadamer 
2004:107). We are inclined to construe 
this notion in terms of bodily emotional 
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presence (different kinds of mood), being 
articulated in different ways, in accord 
with various kinds of play performances. 
Hence, we can speak of both “diachronic” 
and “synchronic” perspectives on interplay 
between biological (or natural) and human 
(or social) aspects of human games and 
play. In other words, there is a historical 
continuity as well as structural contiguity 
of “natural” and “cultural” elements in hu-
man plays. Human play is not just socially 
constructed and territorially limited in its 
origins and scopes, but grows out of and 
remains genetically connected to a wide 
range of play phenomena, from play of 
“water and light” to sport games and artistic 
performances.
Structure (Gebilde)
But what is a distinctive feature of human 
play, especially artistic one? In which as-
pects do artistic performances differ from 
the play of animals? 
From our viewpoint, Gadamer gives to 
this question quite a revolutionary answer. 
Extending his own, although not sufficiently 
articulated, notion of continuity between 
animal, or natural, and human games, Gad-
amer sees the difference between human 
and non-human games as structural one. 
among other things, this means that these 
two sorts of games differ gradually, not cat-
egorically. Human games, i.e., the human 
kind of self-representing experiences, are 
just a stage in the process of (self-)structura-
tion inherent in the game phenomena. 
So, drawing on Gadamer’s reflexions 
in Truth and Method, we can distinguish 
at least four stages in this imaginary struc-
turation process: (1) different kinds of the 
play appearances in inanimate nature, or 
the vegetable kingdom; (2) various forms 
of play behavior in animal world; (3) hu-
man games and plays; and (4), as a separate 
stage, artistic performances. these stages 
follow the logic of increasing repleteness, 
autonomy, or mediality, and performativity 
that were inherent features of game phe-
nomena as such from the very beginning. 
Let us briefly explain these features before 
we proceed to discussing the specificity of 
artistic plays, i.e., art experience. 
Repleteness, a term borrowed from Nel-
son Goodman’s philosophy of art (Good-
man 1968), means in the present context 
the increased integrity of play situation, 
which, in its most pure manifestations such 
as artistic performances, forms some kind 
of convergence of allegedly heterogene-
ous entities: actions, objects, thoughts, and 
moods. In many games we are hardly in a 
position to separate out the particular ele-
ments from the whole play situation that is 
a replete network of these elements, without 
destroying it completely. 
Autonomy, or mediality of play is to 
be understood both topologically and ge-
netically. On the one hand, each game is a 
kind of autonomous territory, which obeys 
its own rules, and transforms everyone’s 
self-consciousness who participates in it. 
Forming new – other – space (real and im-
agined at the same time), the play reveals 
its own normativity and transformative 
(and in this sense, emancipative) potential 
in relation to the codes of everyday life. It 
loosens (in form of carnival, for instance) 
established social orders supported by the 
forces of daily routine. as Gadamer puts 
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it, “the player experiences the game as a 
reality that surpasses him” (Gadamer 2004: 
109). In addition, play both comprises and 
dissolves all categorical oppositions such 
as subject/object, place/world, and space/
time, structuring our thought and practice. 
On the other hand, play, as a kind of het-
erotopy, discloses itself as an origin of all 
possible dispositions in our thought and 
experiences. 
the playing field is not so much a 
substantial formation as a relational one 
that should be analyzed in action-oriented 
paradigm considering spatiality as dynamic 
phenomenon. Precisely such an approach 
to space is elaborated within the phenom-
enological hermeneutics, i.e. by Heidegger 
and Gadamer. Space is not a substance, 
but a complex of relations and linkages. 
and – as a spatial dynamic phenomenon 
(Spielraum) – play should be considered 
in terms of action and agency. It does not 
mean, however, any activity. action, ac-
cording to Heidegger, is always a kind of 
orientation within the substantial linkages 
of the lived world. It is always an answer 
motivated by the situation of the lived world 
that a human, as the Being-in-the-world, is 
“always already” involved in. For this rea-
son Gadamer writes about primacy of play 
over the consciousness of players:
Hence the mode of being of play isn‘t such 
that, for the game to be played, there must be 
a subject who is behaving playfully. rather, 
primordial sense of playing is the medial 
one. Thus we say that something is „playing“ 
(spielt) of somewhere or at some time, that 
something is going on (im Spiele ist) of or 
that something is happening (sich abspielt). 
(Gadamer 2004: 104)
Performativity, a term originating from 
speech act theory, stresses the productive 
aspect of play. Process of play performance 
always brings about something significant 
or meaningful that has not existed before 
it. “Surplus value” of a play performance 
emerges from the new spatial conditions, 
produced within it. The game is a “closed 
world”, which does not exist beyond play 
performance. In other words, performativ-
ity is a complex interconnection of act and 
space. Hence the productivity aspect of play 
performance is obviously interconnected 
with the question of an individual’s acts and 
agency. the agency is here essentially des-
ubjectivized. the player’s action dissolves 
in the whole of the performance as its part, 
obeying the logic constitutive of this whole. 
the four stages of the structuration process 
mentioned above differ in configuration of 
these three components. the ultimate or 
terminal point in the structuration process, 
and hence its inherent possibility, is its 
self-disclosure, or, as Gadamer puts it, “its 
ideality”. 
“Ideality” is precisely a trait that dis-
tinguishes human games from non-human 
ones. It means a heightened interconnection 
of the above mentioned key structural ele-
ments of play situation, and is not under-
stood in the Platonic sense. “Ideality” as a 
late stage in an imagined, that is, theoreti-
cally reconstructed structuration process, 
in turn, finds expression in factor of spec-
tatorship. Spectator here is not meant to be 
necessarily a person, but rather a structural 
moment of game constellation. and if we 
take into account the essentially performa-
tive character of each game, we can draw an 
important conclusion already at this point of 
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our reflexions: seeing and acting constitute 
a strong link within human games. thus, 
as we will show in what follows, a kind of 
spectatorship inherent in human, especially 
artistic, game experience is not identical 
with visual, or ocular, perception. Seeing 
game performance here comes close to be-
ing familiar with it, not so much in cognitive 
as in bodily-emotional sense. 
What distinguishes artistic game ex-
perience from the rest of game phenom-
ena is precisely this “transformation into 
structure”, “in which human play comes 
to its true consummation in being of art” 
(Gadamer 2004: 110). Transformation 
means here not a continuum of modifica-
tions, but a momentary qualitative change. 
It is important to mention that this change 
should not be understood as a kind of 
rapture or even demolition of the basic 
structures of play as an integral part of 
world experience, but, on the contrary, it is 
their radical intensification which ends up 
in heightened self-presentation of world’s 
primary interrelations. For Gadamer, the 
self-presentation of artistic play coincides 
with the self-presentation of the world in 
the sense of Heidegger’s “Being-in-the-
world”. Hence, the art performance is an 
event of the world disclosure, occurring 
amid everyday life. 
So, this change takes a direction oppo-
site to the traditional vector of artistic im-
aginary: not away but toward the everyday 
world, making it visible as a meaningful 
whole. In this sense, we could even say 
that in the case of artistic experience we 
deal not so much with some kind of event 
occurring in the world as with an event of 
the world disclosure, which, nevertheless, 
remains an integral part of our everyday 
experiences. art, according to Gadamer, is 
an integrative moment of everyday life, one 
of its possible forms, mistakenly detached 
from it by modern aesthetic theory. argu-
ably Gadamer’s attitude to aesthetics is not 
so far from Jacques Rancière’s statements 
about the nature of aesthetics, according 
to which “‘aesthetics’ is not a new name 
for the domain of ‘art’. It is a specific con-
figuration of this domain” (Rancière 2009: 
7). Moreover, Gadamer’s reflexions on the 
nature of art bear a strong resemblance 
to Wittgenstein’s notion of the language-
games as the forms of life. “Artistic games”, 
too, represent a strong interconnection of 
meaningful agency, lived spatiality, and 
heightened self-presentation, or structural 
wholeness of the game constellation. the 
emergence of such an interconnection in 
context of art experience is precisely what 
Gadamer calls “transformation into the 
true”, and that is an epistemological effect 
of artistic play constellation.
Image (Bild)
as we have seen, Gadamer’s notion of the 
experience of art goes beyond the concep-
tion of art established both in modern aes-
thetic theory and everyday consciousness. 
art works, according to Gadamer, are “the 
being there [in German: Dasein] of what is 
presented in them” (Gadamer 2004: 129). 
this means that, among other things, what 
gives an artwork its specifically artistic, or, 
more generally, aesthetic status is not the 
intrinsic qualities of an artifact but its place 
and function within a complex situation 
called above the artistic performance. this 
performance establishes spatiality of its 
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own, and embraces both subject’s behavior 
and constellation of related objects. art is 
neither a fact, nor an object, but an event 
belonging both to the local everyday con-
texts and relevant historical tradition. Such 
belonging, however, is a kind of mutual 
dependence. Social and cultural contexts, in 
turn, are being actualized, normalized and 
maintained in various social performances, 
among which art experiences, for many rea-
sons, enjoy paradigmatic status. Gadamer’s 
“open” view on the artwork manifests itself 
most clearly in his conception of image.
Indeed, the concept of structure (Ge-
bilde) for Gadamer is connected semanti-
cally and substantially with the notion of 
image (Bild), and that, obviously, opens a 
broad perspective for applying the idea of 
performative spatiality to the problematics 
of the image in and beyond specifically 
artistic contexts. Of course, the semantic 
links are visible only if we use the original 
terminology. as to substantial linkages, we 
will try to explain them in what follows.
From our point of view, in Truth and 
Method Gadamer has two reasons to intro-
duce the question about an image in the con-
text of his hermeneutic reflections. First rea-
son is methodological one. What has been 
previously discussed in Truth and Method 
in the context of transitory, or “performing” 
arts, i.e., the experience of art as an event of 
(self-)presentation of the world, should now 
be confirmed with regard to statuary arts. 
another and much more important reason 
is Gadamer’s thesis about the universality 
of an image that, supposedly, doesn’t con-
tradict the historicity of this concept. this 
balance between universality und historicity 
was achieved by virtue of the paradigm shift 
in the philosophical image conception, pro-
nounced by Gadamer. Instead of the picture, 
decoration, once discredited by the modern 
aesthetics, should come to the foreground 
as a point of reference in the contemporary 
image theory.
the concept of the picture prevalent in recent 
centuries cannot automatically be taken as 
a starting point. Our present investigation 
seeks to rid itself of that assumption. It tries 
to find a way of understanding the mode of 
being of a picture that detaches it both from 
aesthetic consciousness and from the concept 
of the picture to which the modern gallery 
has accustomed us, and it tries to recuperate 
the concept of the “decorative,” discredited 
by the aesthetics of experience. (Gadamer 
2004: 129)
the image, thus, according to Gadamer, 
is not a thing but a process, a life-world 
event whose structure can be described in 
terms of play, i.e., in terms of mediality and 
performativity. the advantage and heuristic 
potential of this approach lies in the fact 
that Gadamer does not limit his analysis 
of the phenomena of play and image to 
the sphere of aesthetics but consider them 
in the broader context of everyday life (as 
life-world phenomena), revealing in such 
a way their social and anthropological 
significance.
Iconic Agency: Towards  
Hermeneutical Theory  
of the Social Imaginary
In this section we will discuss the main 
structures of the image, hermeneutically 
understood as dimensions of related experi-
ences, which we will call the iconic ones. 
then we will proceed to examining the 
heuristic potential of hermeneutical image 
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conception in the context of contemporary 
social theory. Precisely structural traits of 
images revealed in Truth and Method made 
hermeneutic conception of the image a very 
useful theoretical tool in recent debates 
about the functions of various images in 
social theoretical contexts. 
Images as enhancers of (social) 
Being 
as we have mentioned above, Gadamer is 
well aware of the tension between the di-
versity of historical images and ontological, 
that is, universalistic claims of his theory. 
the way that Gadamer reduces this tension 
is his adherence to the notion of an image as 
a structure, or structural configuration that 
involves all elements of our experience, 
including ourselves, in the transformative 
process. the main outcome of this process 
is seeing something particular (an object or 
complex situation) as presenting the collec-
tive, that is, social meanings. In other words, 
we have to differentiate between an image 
(or artwork) as а historical artifact and as a 
form of experience. this differentiation of 
two notions of an image implies not a con-
tradiction, but rather a genetic and structural 
interconnection between them.
like in the case of artistic play or per-
formance, in the case of “image perception” 
we are not dealing with the objects endowed 
with specific (i.e., artistic) qualities. We 
are rather getting involved in disclosing 
the human world. and this interconnection 
of world (as, of course, universal) and dis-
closing process (as situated and historical) 
manifest overcoming the above mentioned 
tension. thus, for Gadamer, the image is not 
an object but both an event and its effects. 
What belongs to these effects in the first 
place is the enhancement of our Being, or, 
as Gadamer puts it, an “increase in being” 
of our connections to the world and to each 
other as social entities (Gadamer 2004: 
129). In other words, due to such events 
and experiences, the world becomes more 
livable. 
In the second part of his reflexions on 
the nature of an image, offered in Truth and 
Method, Gadamer explicitly implements a 
paradigm shift from the notion of art and 
artwork to the phenomena once marginal-
ized in classical aesthetic theory, such as 
architecture and decoration. Both have a 
set of methodological advantages over so-
called artworks. the most important one 
is the blocking of established aesthetic at-
titudes, that is, demolition of differentiation 
between aesthetic and substantial aspects of 
the world experience. We are hardly able 
to differentiate a building from its environ-
ment, whether urban or natural, and thus 
separate architectural presentation from the 
space presented. Hence the impossibility to 
distinguish between aesthetic (or decora-
tive) and functional aspects of the experi-
ence of the building as well. In this case, 
the perceptive experience of an object (a 
building) merges at the same instant into the 
manifestation of space. an image, accord-
ing to Gadamer, does the same work. and 
only our uncritical adherence to the idea of 
artwork, understood as a separate object in 
the context of subject’s perception, makes 
us blind to it. For this reason, Gadamer of-
fers a notion of decoration as a “full-scale 
model” of artistic (iconic) experience:
the nature of decoration consists in per-
forming that two-sided mediation: namely 
181
to draw the viewer’s attention to itself, to 
satisfy his taste, and then to redirect it away 
from itself to the greater whole of the life 
context which it accompanies. (Gadamer 
2004: 129)
Hermeneutic conception of an image 
in external contexts
Now we would like to sketch out the 
contours of the possible application of 
Gadamer’s notion of an image within the 
recent discussions about social functions 
of images. 
a few years ago american sociologist 
Jeffrey Alexander has pronounced “an 
iconic turn in cultural sociology”. Moreo-
ver, he has proposed an idea of “iconic 
consciousness” as a sociologically relevant 
factor, which “occurs when an aesthetically 
shaped materiality signifies social value”. 
alexander defends an idea of a sensual 
experience that is able to transmit meaning, 
sometimes using quite eccentric formula-
tions: “The surface, or form, of a material 
object is a magnet, a vacuum cleaner that 
sucks the feeling viewer into meaning (al-
exander 2010: 11). Due to their aesthetically 
constructed surfaces some objects become 
“invested with social meaning”, that is, they 
become “archetypical”, or, as he puts it in 
a different way, “wield depth” (Alexander 
2008: 3). The ability of some material 
aesthetic surfaces to generate and transmit 
meaning is that what makes these surfaces 
iconic. But these “aesthetic objects become 
iconic by drawing us into the heart of the 
world” (Alexander 2008: 6). This process 
he describes also as an “immersion in the 
materiality of social life” (Alexander 2008: 
6). thus, like Gadamer, alexander insists on 
the idea of an image, or icon, as a spatial 
condition of everyday world, on its agency, 
not just bare facticity. In other words, for 
alexander, as for Gadamer, icons are not 
objects, but configurations of experience, 
which are socially and anthropologically 
inescapable. But unlike Gadamer, alexan-
der contents himself with a description of 
different forms of what he calls social icons, 
without raising a claim to theoretically 
more differentiated explanation of how the 
iconization mechanisms work.
But what Gadamer’s conception of im-
age is lacking is the systematic analysis of 
pictorial surfaces, the grammar of combi-
nation of their components, which makes 
them into transmitters and distributors of 
social meaning. elements of such system-
atic analysis we can find in contemporary 
analytic philosophy (Hayman 2006; Hop-
kins 1998; Lopes 1996). But what we have 
learned from philosophical hermeneutics is, 
first of all, a fascinating notion that seeing 
some images can be equated to the primary 
modes of being in the world.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we would like to recapitulate 
the main theses of the article and outline 
some consequences and some further per-
spectives. 
The conceptual horizon of our reflex-
ions has been determined by the notion of 
the life-world understood as inescapable 
ground of human theoretical and practical 
self-consciousness, which we consider as a 
watershed between reflexive (Husserlian) 
and hermeneutic (Heideggerian) versions of 
phenomenological project. Perhaps the term 
“facticity” coined by the young Heidegger 
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expresses the specificity of this notion more 
properly. Facticity of human being means 
in the first instance that human conscious-
ness is rather a permanent practical task 
than theoretically identifiable “source of 
constitution”. We are aware of the holistic 
facticity of our being in the mode of non-
theoretical understanding (hermeneutical 
interpreting), which in turn is an integral 
part of human being. this hermeneutical 
way of phenomenological philosophy led it, 
as a result, to the unreserved acknowledge-
ment of the priority of everyday experienc-
es, rooted in the non-transparent historical 
tradition, over any theoretical stance includ-
ing phenomenological one. In other words, 
the source of “constituting activities” was 
relocated from transcendental subjectivity 
to some kinds of everyday events, among 
others to art experiences as well. the main 
feature of these experiences is what we 
might call “transcendence in immanence”: 
being an integral part of everyday life, these 
events and experiences are, nevertheless, 
able to transcend it, while articulating it as 
a meaningful whole. In this regard, they 
have a function of world disclosure as of 
world establishing.
Hans-Georg Gadamer has taken this 
notion several steps further. He explicitly 
considers art experience as a new paradigm 
for Humanities, which is able to account for 
the specificity and status of the knowledge 
of the truth in historical sciences. even 
more importantly, art experience connected 
through phenomenon of play to the wide 
range of non-artistic aspects of reality 
becomes a point of reference for the whole 
phenomenological project at a recent stage 
of its development. the different kinds 
of artistic experience are considered by 
Gadamer to be the various forms of the 
spontaneous (self-)revealing of the human 
being-in-the-world, which presents a strong 
interconnection between thinking, seeing, 
and acting. 
unlike Heidegger, Gadamer refuses 
the elitist understanding of art, having 
foregrounded the ordinary forms of not 
so much artistic as iconic experience. and 
if we take into account, on the one hand, 
the meaning-making (or world disclosing) 
potential of iconic perception as a form of 
artistic experience, and, on the other hand, 
the proliferation of images as one of the key 
factors of contemporary social life,we will 
come to the conclusion about the produc-
tivity of phenomenological-hermeneutical 
account of the image perception for recent 
social theoretical debates.
From our viewpoint, phenomenologi-
cal hermeneutics can contribute to fulfill-
ing the following theoretical tasks arising 
from the proliferation of visual images in 
contemporary  culture: the explanation of 
how some pictorial representations gain 
their suggestive power; the systematic 
analyses of meaning-making potentials of 
image perception as compared with ones 
of the language; the introduction of prob-
lematics of visual image perception into 
social anthropological contexts; the fur-
ther elaboration of structural intersection 
of visuality, spatiality, and agency, which 
allows for the ocular-centrism typical for 
some theoretical positions in contemporary 
visual culture studies; last but not least, the 
elaboration of the notion of artistic experi-




men eutical approach to the visual image 
perception, augmented by advantages 
of another research strategies, such as 
semiotics and analytic philosophy, could 
make a substantial contribution to the 
conversion of phenomenology from the 
respectable philosophical tradition into 
the strong partner in recent sociocultural 
discussions.
MATYTI PAVEIKSLą – BŪTI PASAuLYJE: VIZuALuMo, ERDVIŠKuMo IR VEIKuMo  
SąRYŠIAI FILoSoFINėJE HERMENEuTIKoJE
Ilya Inishev, Yuliya Biedash
Santrauka. Straipsnis skirtas atskleisti hermeneutinės paveikslo sąvokos euristinį potencialą šiuolakinėje vizu-
alinėje kultūroje. H. G. Gadameris analizavo paveikslą kaip vizualinį, erdvinį ir socialinį reiškinį, išplėsdamas 
ir sykiu transformuodamas įprastą ikoninio patyrimo sampratą. Paveikslas pirmiausia yra ne estetikos ar meno 
kritikos tyrinėjimo objektas, o socialinis reiškinys, kuris turi būti vertinamas su jo realiais ir įsivaizduojamais 
požymiais bei sąryšiais su gyvenamojo pasaulio struktūromis. Savo paveikslo teorijoje suliedamas meno ir 
gyvenimo ribas, Gadameris atveria aibę galimybių analizuoti pačias įvairiausias vaizdines praktikas – nuo 
mokslo iki teatro.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Gadamer, paveikslas, filosofinė hermeneutika, erdvė, veikumas, socialinės ikonos
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